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The law of judicial remedies deals wiLh the nature and scope of
relief afforded a plaintiff following appropriate court procedures and
after establishment of a substantive right. These remedies usually
fall in one of four categories: (1) damages, (2) restitution, (3) coercion
and (4) declaration. This presentation will deal principally with the
damages remedy, but a few thoughts regarding the use of a restitutionary
remedy are introduced toward the end of these remarks.
I will divide my presentation into six headings, beginning with
some general comments related to Che damages remedy.
1. INTRODUCTION
Damages is a money remedy aimed at making Sood the plaintiff’s
losses. It is compensatory in character , measuring the loss sustained
by the injured party in monitary terms. In many instances this mea-
surement is made by comparing profits or prices during the violation
period with what would have been achieved absent che violation, or by
measuring a loss of value or by cost of repair or replacement. Within
this framework there are a number of fundamental legal principles
that pertain.
General v. Special Damages ——.
Courts traditionally attack the problem of assessing damages in a
two-step process. J?irst, they lay down and apply a rule of general
damages. Second, they add special (consequential) damages that are
adequately proved and not regarded as too remote. General damage
theories vary by thenature of the legal injury and tend to be accepted
using generalized standards and variables. Courts are more willing to
award general.damages than to provide special damages.--’2-
Special damages must have been caused in fact by t:hedefendant’s
actionable conduct, mus~ ‘beproved to a reasonable certainty, and.must
not be too remote. These basj.c limitations apply whether we are speaking
of tort, con~ract, property, or antitrust injuries.
‘She first of these principles demonstrates the close kinship between
liability and damages. Even when we speak of general damages we are
reminded that the damages awarded should he.cus.tonr-tailoredto the sub-
stantive issues involved. This is particularly important in selecting of
the appropriate antitrust damage theory where violations may range from
price discrimination to bid-rigging to blockaded entry to price-fixing.
In each of several situations, statutory and common law provides some
guidelines, but the theory selected is quite dependant upon the structure
of the market, pricing methods employed, trade practices, and the economic
logic that interrelates these considerations.
The amount of damages recovered must be proved with reasonable certainty.
While this is particularly true for special damages it also bears serious
consideration in the choice and measurement of particular general damage
models. occasionally statistical measures of significance may be employed
as a guide to what constitutes “reasonable certainty” but courts tend to
look beyond quantitative guidelines, relying upon historical experience
and business potential that goes to the heart of practical entreprenuership.
Certainly for any special damage recovery and for most recoveries
based upon more general theories, the contract principle of foreseeabili-ty
or the tort concept of proximate cause pertains. In most antitrust damage
situations of my knowledge and experience this principle is used not violated
“butone could envision the development of a chain of cause-effect relation-
ships that could lead to the violation of this rule.
Analytical Standards
To measure a loss it is necessary to develop a standard to which actual
profits, prices, costs, and values can be relatecl. ‘l%estatement of the
standards used in antitrust situations is less definitive in comparison
with damage problems involving property, tor~s, and contracts. Frequently
a standard employed in antitrust situations involves asking the question
“what price (profit) would prevail in a freely (purely) competitive situ-
ation?” Many times this is an inappropriate question simply because a
purely competitive market situation could not be reasonably be expecced
to ever exist. Unfortunately many economic models used that permit the
development of a competitive standard to assume pure competition rather
than mere ‘~competitive activity.”
The selection of an analytica].standard for purposes of measuring
antitrust damages is both fundarnent.al and of extreme importance in any
antitrust problem. Because there are a wide range of possible logical-3-
pi. tfalls in Lhe use of one standard versus another it is important that
an economist be involved in this aspect of the damage analysis. Another
important concern is the availability of data for the measurernenc of the
damages prior to selection of the theory used. Since Che data needed
for the measurement may “have to be obtained during the discovery period
:Ltis important that the economist’ involved be contacted prior to the
.tssuanceof interrogatories.
Courts have used, with some regularity, three bi~si~methods in
computing damages suffered by antitrust plaintiffs: (1) the before and
after approach, (2) the yardstick theory and (3) che market. share theory.
‘Theredo exist other theories, depending upon the antitrust violation
:Lnvolved.
11. THE BEFORE AND AFTIIRAPPROACH
The “before and after” approach compares a plaintiff’s profit
situation in two distinct time periods% and uses his own business and its
performance to make the calculations of lost profits. Generally, the
plaintiff’s profit position prior to the impact of the antitrust violation
:Lscompared with his position during the impact. There are, however,
three possible variations to this approach, based on the time spans for
which given sets of data are available.
First, profits (or sales) during the period of the impact may be
compared with the same data for the period immediately following the
:Lmpact. .ludge Friendly outlined this approach in Herman Schwabe, Inc. “v.
lJnited Shoe Machinery Cor~.:
“Although, because of defendant’s long domination of the market,
plaintiff could not show how sales and profits once realized in a
free market had diminished, no reason is seen why it could not
have proceeded in the opposite direction, by showing how its sal~~
and profits had waxed as United’s unlawful practices had waned.”-
Neither of the other two variations has been formally adopted by a
court, but they are both logical outgrowths of the basic approach. First,
]?rofits earned prior,to the period of impact of the antitrust violation
i~nd profits earned after the period of impact may, by interpolation, be
used to calculate the profits that a plaintiff would have earned during
the impact period absent the violation. Second, profits earned between
the periods of impact of two distinct antitrust violations may be extra-
]?olated to calculate the profits that a plaintiff would have earned absent
the violations during the two distinct impact periocls.
Prior to Central Coal and Coke Co. v. Hartrnan, most courts took the ——
position that profits earned by a business were so dependent on numerous
~~’29’7F.2d 906 (2d Cr. 1962)and uncertain contingencies chaJ@ey could not be proved with any
reasonable degree of.certainty--- Thus, profits were not recoverable as
damages. The court in Hartman, however, stated that -—
“proof of ~he expenses and of the income of the business for a
reasonable time anterior to and duri.n~ the interruption charged,
or of facts of equival.enc import, is indispensable to a Lawful
judgment for clamagas for the 1.0ssof the...profits of an established
business.”
Because the rule lai.cl down in Hartman requires a plaintiff’s business LO
be operating prior to the violation, it necessarily excludes calculation
of profits from a new business.> and profits to be earned in.the future
by a business. The language “facts of equivalent import,” however, seems
Suffici.
theory ~?t~”y ‘Pen
-ended to include at least some of the variations to the
.
The United States Supreme Court in two subsequent cases relaxed the
pl.ainti.ff’s burden of proof under the before and after theory, but these
developments did little to overcome the inherent drawbacks of the approach
itself. In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Co.$ the Court made i.t .—. —.
clear that since the defendant’s wrongful conduct had made ascertainment
of plaintiff’s dama~es difficult,
‘he47
e~endant could not complain that
the damage calculation was imprecise.- Moreover, the Court permitted the
plaintiff CO calculate net profits by subtractin~ an est..imated expense of
doing business from an,established pattern of gross profits. l’l~is meant
that antitrust plaintiffs no longer had to pt-ovcttlciractual COSL of
doing business in order co recover damag,es.
In Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., t,heCourt — —. —.
upheld the jury’s finding that the measure of damages was the difference
between what. the plaintiff actually realized and what he would have
received from sal$7 at reasonable prices except for the unlawful acts
of the defendant.– The effect was that a plaintiff no longer had to prove
the actual price at which the product would have sold, but could base his
damages calculation on a reasonable price for the product.
Despite the Supreme Court’s relaxation of the before and after theory
to ease the plaintiff~s burden of proof on the issue of lost profits,
use of the theory is striccly limited. First, the plaintiff’s business
must be one that is established and operating prior to the impact of the
~1’
111 F’.96 (flthGr. 1901)
~/’
Some fresh insight is presented in Frank L. Williamson, “1.ostProfits
as Contract Damages for an Unestablished Business: The New Business
Rule Becomes Outdated,” 693 No. Car. L. Rev. 56 (1978) .———
Al
273 U.S. 359 (1927)
>/
282 Us. 555 (1931)--5-
conspi.racy to restrain trade. Thus , the theory is unavailable to a
plaintiff who is prevencecl from enterin~ a market because of the defendant’s
actions. Second, illorder to compare earning before and after the vioJ.ation,
but Lhose earnings must have been reasonably uniform over time. Otherwise,
a court applying the theory would not know which earnings to use for the
“before” period, and the damage calculations would be too speculative.
111. THE YARDSTICK THEORY
The second theory for proving lost profits i.nantitrust cases is the
“yardstick” method. While the before-and-after theory compares profit
data for the plaintiff’s business over two or more time periods, the
yardstick theory compares the plaintiff’s sales or profits during ~he
period of impact of the antitrust violation to those of a similar company
that was not adversely affected by the defendant’s an.ticompetitive practices.
‘he ‘irst attempt ‘c)‘se6!he yardstick theory was made in ~igel.ow v._
RKO Radio Pictures, Inc--- In addition to showing lost profits under
the before and after theory, the plaintiff introduced evidence comparing
the earn:ingsof his theater with those of a competing theater that had
benefited from the defendant’s actions. The evidence established that
the net receipts of the competitor for the period of impact exceeded
the plaintiff’s net receipts by $116,000. The plaintiff’s showing under
the before and after theory was that its receipts fell off by $125,000
during the same period. The Supreme Court did not find the two theories
mutually exclusive. Affirming a verdict for the plaintiff based on the
before and after theory, the Court stated that it did “not imply that
the verdict could not be supported on some other theory.”
Following the cieci.sion in Bi.gelow, courts adopted and developed the
yardstick theory in a number of other cases. In William Goldman Theaters
v. Loew’s, Inc.,
.—
the trial court arrived ac an estimate of damages by
;~ributing t= earnings of one of the defendant’s nearby theaters to the
plaintiff’; theater and then subjectively adj~~tintz that amount to account
for the differences between the two theaters.– In addition to considering
the average gross income of the various theaters, the court admitted and
considered evidence of the average profits of the theaters in question,
although it stated that such evidence was not controlling.
Later courts mo~ified the Goldman approach by refining the factor by
which the two or more businesses are to be compared, making the damage
computation more certain and thus easier to prove. __ In Hornewood Theatre,
Inc. v, Loew’s, Inc. the Court focused on
“net !r%7ec::p::;; :::::l”:::d
by subtracting film—;ental costs from gross recelpts.– .
(j/
327 U.S. 251 (19~+6)
]-/
69 F. supp. 103 (E.D. Pa. 1946), aff’cl, 164 F 2d 102~ (3d Cir), cert.
denied, 334 U.S. 811 (1948).
—-
,-.,
“ 110 J?.Supp. 398 (D. Minn. 1952).riefenciant’s conduct limited the pl.ainti-f”f to showlnf2secon~i- run movi.cs .
Despite the apparent 10ss of revenue from this change of ~tatus, Kilt’
cowrt recognized that a second- run theater would suffer no economic loss
if the reduction in ics };rossreceipts caused by the antitrust vic)lation
was less than the reductj.on in its film renttal. costs. And, reasoning
that a second--run theater might have lower advertisitlg costs than a f~.rst-
run theater, the Court in Milwaukee Towne Cor~. v. Loew’s Inc. calculated __—..—...—.- — ..-. —_-... -_-. . ..~— -—._._
net gross receipts by subtracting advert” ‘ $yi.rlg coscs of each tlheater. as
well as film cost, from gross receipts. --”
Althou@ most of the cases in which the yardstick theory has been
applied invo~ved the moci.on picture ~.ndust.ry, the same approach may
be app].icable i.nother areas. There are% however, Four serious limitations
to the use of Chis theory in other than t-hemotion picture industry.
First, the plaintiff’s firm and the yardsci.ck firm must he enxaged in the
same line of business. The 1.SWas applied in the theacc?rcases, especially
in Homewoocl, suggests a very strict adherence to l:hiscriterion. But ,
while the two businesses must be in the same line of commerce, they need
not he identical. The Court in Loew’s, T.nc.v. Cinema Amusements, Inc:_ .— —..———”------
stated that the d.iffcrences between the base theater and the plaintiff’s
theater went to the wei~ht to ~~,accorded the evidence and not to the
adm.issihility of the evidence.-—
Second, not only must the two firms be ensaged in the same business,
but the yardstick .Eirmlmustbe operating within a market structure and
under cost and demand conditions similar to those tilatthe plaintiff
would have faced absent the.violation. Tl~emeans that the yardstick
theory cannot be used successfu].ly if there is a wide disparity in the
sizes of’the firms in a market or if there is widespread product differ-
enti.ati.cm in the market, since these facts would be reflected in d~sparace
cost and demand characteristics cjfche plaintiff and any potential yard-
stick firm. This limitation is illustrated by the refusal of the court
to grant damagy~,to the plaintiff in 17~o Glass and Paint CO. V. CIOhe ————...——.
American Corp.— “Inchat case,
-—
the p~aintiff was a wholesaler of gas
ranges (in addition to other home appliances). Defendant Globe, a
manufacturer of gas ranges, entered into a contract to sell its entire
output to defendant N!aytag, another who.less].er. ‘1’he plaintiff claimed
that the arrangernen~ between Globe and Maytag violated the antitrust
laws and tried to prove dama[;esby comparing its profits with the profits
“ 1.901?.2d 561 (7th Gr. 195.1),cert. denied, 342 U.S. 909 (1952). .—.——
10/ 210 1?.2d 86 (lOth Ci.r.), cert. denied. 347 U.S. C)76 (1954) — ————
lA’ 201 F. 2d 534 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 942 (1953) ——.————.-1-
Of Maytag. The Seventh Circuit CourC of Appeals stated ~hat it could
not award damages to the plaintiff when there was no evidence th,ai: the
plaintiff wrILIlcl have sold as much as Maytag, or that it would have
realized the same profit. In addition, there was no ev:iclence in the
record as to the plainti.ffts and ]Iaytagis comparative costs of doing
business.
Third$ the yardstick firm should also occupy a market position
similar to the position the plaintiff would have held absent Che violation.
If the plaintiff is among the dominant firms in the market, the yardstick
firm must also be in that position. Similarly, if the plaintiff is a
smal,l.er, less dominant. firm, so must che yardsrick be. Even if the yard-
stick firm meets all the other criteria, Elm variance in profits attributable
to market position suggests that an accurate damage calculation may not
be possible absent a market position similar to that of the plaintiff.
Fourth, the defendant’s firm can seldom be used as the yardstick
firm. In acldition to che problems recognized in Fargo Paint, the basic
flaw in the use of the defendant’s business as a yardstick during the
..——
period of the impact of the antitrust violation is that
“[i]t seems obvious that if the conspiracy benefited the defendant’s
business, such business does not represent profits made in a free
and open market. The teaching of Victor Talking Machine Co. ‘v. —..—
Keme~ [271.1?.810 (3rd Cir.
.— _—.—
1921)] is that in measuring damages it is ——
improper to use as a base business resultin~ from a violation. If
any such evidence were permitted, it would have the effect of giving
to the plaintiff the fruits of the conspiracy and then the resulting
judgment would treble such a verdict. Where the defendant business
is the only available ‘Iyarclstick,” before such evidence is admitted
there should be deducted an ap ,,~~~priate amount for any increase
resulting from the violation. -——
Thus the yardstick theory, while usef~ll in some situations, is of
limited applicability in many others because to malce the theory reliable,
the above conditions must be met relating co firm size market structure
and market position.
LJ/ ~ ~imberlak,e
. , Federal.Treble Damage Antitrust Actions(1965), p. 332.-8-
The market
theories. ‘rhi.s
m~arketshares c>fthe plaintiff and the defendant. Damages are compuced
by Translating the plaintiff’s ‘lostmarket share in~o a dollar volume
of :;oodsthat he would have sold, whicli i.sthen multipl iai by tile plain--
tiffvs historical. profit margin.
The first courts to LiSe this theory clevel.oped i.tas an out~rowth of
tilebefore and after and uhe yardstick approacl~es. Altl)ou&{h courts and
plaintiffs often dealt with damages in the concext of rhe exiscin?, theories,
their accual appl.i.cation more cl.ost~lv resembled t.hcmarket share tk)eory.
[n Richfield Oii Corp, v. Karseal Corl., the plaintiff tried co USC:the ———. —.—.—..—.—.
yardstick theory to show lost profits by comparin~: the sales of its firm
with the sales of a base firm, the sales of y~~ch Wet-e traditionally one-
third to one-seventh those of the plaintiff.-— 1.naddition, the plain-t-
iff showed that it was staffed, equipped} and able to produce a sufficient
amount of its product to meet the addi.tionai sales. The plaint~ff also
introduced evidence showing its ne~ profit per case of its product. me
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals without elaborating; ruled chat the .j~lry
was entitled to infer from such ev-iidence that in the absence of the defen-
dant’s illegal.conduct, the plaintiff would have SO].CI three times as
much of its product as the base firm,did.during the same period. Citin8
Story Pare’hmq~, the Court compared the uncertai.nry of the damage compu-
tation in a personal injury case: “There are many cases in which damages
are allowed the element-of uncertainty is at least ec]ualto that in the
present case--as, for example, copyri~ht and trade mark cases~ cases of
unfair competition, and many cases t>~ersonal in*r~. ...“
‘eison & Sons !t}cll – : —
The next ——— ..—
major case in this theroy was applied w’asP,angen, Inc. v. Sterl.i~ _..- —..-.—— .-. —
— There, a contractor was accused of obtaining certain ———z. 4
contracts by bribing a state official. ‘l’he evidence established that
four firms had bid on the contracts in question and that the plaintiff
and the other three firms had bid with approxi.matel.y equal success on
similar contracts in Ehe past. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals computed
the plaintiff~s damages by calculating gross revenue from the business
of one-fourth of the contracts and then multiplying that amount by the
plaintiff’s historical profit mar%in.
A similar calculation was made by the
1.5?
urt-appoint’ed master in
the case of Locklin v. f)a~-~lo Color Corp.-—— The master computed the -———— .——.
-~”~}’ 271 F. 2d 709 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 961 (1960). .——
“’ 351 F. 2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966). . ..-—- —.
‘5-’ 429 F. 2d 873 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 400 U.S. 1.020 (1971), .——-__—?—--&-
plaintiff’s lost sales by multiplying the sales for che total market by
the plaintiftts estimated sl~areof Lhe market absent the defendan~’s illegal
activity and then by the plaintiff’s profit margin. The plaintiff’s prof.i.t
rate was considered by the master co be between its actual rate for the
impact period and the higher: rate the plaintiff claimed it would l)ave
received absent the defendant’s illegal action.
Subsequent to Rangen-, a variation on the market share theory of
proving damages was approved by the Eight~6~ircuit Court of Appeals in
Arthur “Murray~ Inc. v. Reserve Plan, Inc---- In that case, ————..—.-.— the plaintiff,
=;erve Plan, sold dance lessons, some of which were franchised by defen-
dant Arthur Murray$ “[nc. Arthur Murray withdrew its franchise when the
plaintiff refused to accept its financing plan. After finding the defen-
dant in violation of the antitrust laws, the Court appointed a special
master to compute damages caused by the loss of the Arthur Murray franchise.
The master first calculated from the evidence in the plaintiff’s records
that one-half of the plaintiff’s business was attributable to the defendant.
He then multiplied the plaintiff’s total.annual income by one-half,
reflecting the fact that half of the plaintiff~s business consisted of
Arthur Murray accounts. Finally, the master subtracted from that figure
the expenses attributable to the Arthur Eurray portion of plaintiff’s
business (one-half of total expenses).
The United States Supreme Court first approved the Tw’y:::e
theory in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.—
sued by Hazeltine for patent infringement, counterclaimed under the’
antitrust laws, alleging that it was unlawfully excluded from competing
with the plaintiff in Canada. The trial Court awarded damages to Zenith,
reasoning that Zenith had introduced evidence that indicated that but for
the defendant’s illegal conduct it would have achieved sixteen percent
of the Canadian television market at the outset of and throughout the
damage period. The Court computecl the award by subtracting from the
sixteen percent figure the three percent share of the Canadian television
market actually obtained by Zenith. A similar determination was made for
the Canadian radio market. On appeal the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the award to Zenith, holding that the fact that Zenith
was able to show damages under the market share theory did not prove
that damages were in fact suffered.
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, and, on remand, the
Seventh Circuit stated that the measure of damages was the “difference
between percentage share that defendant actually enjoyed during the
“ 406 F, 2cl1138 (8th Cir. 1969).
17/ 401 U.S. 321, rehearing denied, 401 U.S. 1015 (1971). —-10--
damage period and the percentage it would have had as a free corn petitor.”
The Court, Citing Bi&, elow> nocecl LilacZenith’s testimony as to CIIC
Simi].arities hetwe.en Ehc!Canadian and American markets was COmp6!LMlt
evidence by which the amount of damages could be reasonably approximated .
The Ck]urtstated, however, that some of the damages awarded by the tri.:~”1
Court we’re‘basedon actions of the plaintiff whi.cl] occurred prior K.o
1959} the earliest date for which ciamaS~:s could be claimed under the
fc~uryear statute of J.imitations and remanded the case to the trial Court
for a recomputation of Ze~lith’s c[amages.
Zenith again appealed to tileSupreme Court, which reversed tileholclins
as to pre-L959 damages a.nci set out certain standards to be used i.ndeter-
mining whether damages S11OUICI be awarded for IOSL future profits. Tl)e
Court stated that losses occurring in the futurt:are unrecoverable if tile
fact of their accrual is specula~ive or their amount and nature are
unprovable. Further, it held that the refusal by a court to award
future dama~:es on grounds that they are too speculative is equivalent
to holding that no cause of action has arisen as to those dama[jes, r. f
and when they are sufferecl they may rl)cmhe sued upon within four years
after the date on which they were inflicted. The ~OUr~ thus reasoned
that had Zenith sued for pre-1959 damages in 1954, determined by the
appeals court as the time at which the cawe of acticm on such damages had
arisen, it would not have been able t.oshow future injury with such
reasonable certainty as to be awarded damages for the period of 1954-
1959.
Although the market share theory has recencly achieved acceptance
as a method for proving lost profits, it suffers from several l.imitations.
Extensive and complicated data are required to compute the actual damages
suffered, as well as to Ienclsupport to the use c)fthe theory at all..
In order to make the caicul.atic)ns, at least four types of information
are required: (1) a clear defini.ti.on of the relevant market; (2) historical
sales data c~nthat market and on relateclrnarket.s;(3) economic history
and trends of the relevant market; anf8jf+)evidc‘rice of’the plaintiff’s
ability to enter the relevant market.—- .Ifall the data needed for
the calculations are not available, the plaintiff will be forced to
assert many assumptions shout the markets and firms involved. If these
assumptions are unsupported by evidence, recovery can be precluded
under the theory,
..-. ———..—.—. —..
‘~ Lee Gibbons, The “Market Share“ ‘~heo~~f Damaxes in Private ———.- — .—- ——.—-
l?nforcernent Cases, 18 Antitrust 13u~~. 743 (1973). .——V. O’lWERAPPROACHES
Two other antitrust.damage. theories deserve discussion: (1) the
cost approach and (2) a restitutionary theory.
The Cost ~oach ....—
A seemingly obvious yardstick standard that can be employed is to
compare prices with costs. It is deceptively straightforward that a
comparison of costs anclprices will reveal a profit picture which can be
employed, with some modifi.cation$ as a measure of profits that may
suggest the exi.stancw of “excess profits” or as a measure of lost prof~.c.s
to an injured plaintiff.
In practice the use of cost data in proving damages in antitrust
situations has been li.mi.ted.This may partially reflect a judicial
reluctance to address several difficult economic and accounting problems
associated with the concept of cost.
One of the problems is practical. Whose cost is to be used? The
low-cost producers, the firm making the sale, or the average for the
industry? which costs are to be included? Average costs, marginal costs,
production costs? A second set of problems are conceptual in nature.
Conspiratorially influenced cost levels may be only tenuously linked to
cost levels produced by free unfettered competition. Costs that are
actually reported may reflect in accurate allocation of overhead costs
in multi-product firms. Costs also may not represent what would prevail
under competition considering the various forms of nonprice competition
that could or would prevail.
Costs are an ambiguous concept, particularly with regard to the
allocation of overhead expenses, the apportioning of costs among various
products, the measurement of investment and required rates of return, the
adjustments for depreciation and i,nventories,and changes in accounting
practices over time.
A number of conclusions are drawn by Erickson that should be heeded
by those considering this approach:
“(l) A primary theory of damages based solely on cost data is
often of limited validity;
(2) Unadjusted cost data gathered during conspiratorial periods
are unreliable guides to hypothetical competitive costs;
(3) Any damage theory largely based on conspiratorially influenced
cost levels is questionable;
(4) Costs are more likely to be reliable indicators of damages if
they are collected during non-conspiratorial periods and if
they are adjusted to compensate for the potential sources of-12-
error described above;
(5) However imperfec~ they may be, costs can produce v~. able damage
estimates which may or may not.be as adequate as other approach=;
and
(6) If used, full and comprehensive pre-trial acce” ‘ and examination
,,1$/
of cost data should be granted all litigants. -—-
Restitution in AntiErus~
Recently I was involved in a bid-rigging problem where false bids
were submitted so as to insure a winning bidder a contract. The awarded
contract allegedly permitted the price fixer only ~’normal.” profits,
suggesting that no injury was sustained.
It is my thesis that a rest%tutionary theory can and should bc
employed in this type of situation. To me it is analogous to a conversion
where a chactel is used to obtain profits for the benefit of the converco’r.
In the law of restitution these ill-gotten gains would be used as a measure
of damages and would be awarded to the owner of the chattel.
In a similar fashion I believe it could be persuasively argued Chat
an ill-gotten contract, obtained through bid-rigging, should have as its
measure of damages the profits realized, but these should be punitively
trebled.
VI. CONCLUSION
The attempt here has not been to be exhaustive in the review of
alternative antitrust damage theories. Rather principle approaches
have been outlined in an effort to illustrate theories that have received
acceptance by the courts and which have a basis in economic logic and
business experience.
Occasionally commentators on antitrust damage law state that another
approach is the use of expert opinion. But, in the words of Weinberg,
“This is hardly a meaningful distinction however, since experts
are often called upon in developing evidence under the (,several
damage theory) tests. .,llmploying these relatively recently developed
techniques, experts can present models designed to show a variety
of factors which might influence a firm in a specific marketplace.
These projections and models have become increasingly sophisticated,
and have often been found persuasive by the courts, provided that
the premises from which the expert develops his conclusions have
~’W Bruce Erickson , “Costs and Conspiracy: The Uses of Cost Data in
Private Antitrust ’Litigation,” 14 The Anti.Crust Bulletin 347 (1969). —.
An appendix to this paper presents a comparison of damafie theories
from the Erickson article.-13-
,,20/
been established in the evidence. -—
while I was unable to be present during what I am sure was a series
of stimulating sessions this morning on the use of the expert, permit
me to offer a few suggestions in closing. First, identify a group of
possible experts shortly after you have filed your complaint and it appears
that a battle is going to ensue. The gains involved in bringing several.
experts in at an early state are several: you will have the opportunity
to evaluate the qualifications of the several experts first-hand, you will
be provided with a number of useful ideas by them that can be used in both
the substantive and damage aspects of the case and you will be able to
gain some guidance as to information ancldata needs as your case and
investigation proceeds. Further, these experts may be able to provide you
with some judgments regarding the length of time that is necessary to
conduct supportive economic studies and the costs that might be anticipated
in relation to them.
Increasingly the use of the expert, especially in complex litigation,
has become commonplace. In selecting your expert be sure that you provide
him access to all aspects of the proceedings and data, keep him regularly
updated as to developments that affect his work, and use him as you would
a colleague in the discussion of liability arguments and anticipated
counter arguments.
.
~/David B Weinberg, . “Recent Trends in Antitrust Civil Action Damage
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